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The Family Estate Trust: Tax Myths and Realities
The "pure equity" or "family estate" trust, a device widely
marketed across the United States, is "guaranteed" by its proponents to alleviate the burdens of income taxation.' The trust is
best described as an irrevocable, inter vivos, complex trust and
is sold as a tax avoidance device2to thousands of unsophisticated
purchasers, often without full disclosure of its potential for generating litigation. This Comment examines the probable income
tax consequences of the family estate trust by contrasting the
legal positions of the trust's proponents and Internal Revenue
Service.

Although currently marketed in various forms, the distinguishing characteristic of the family estate trust is that the same
individual fills four trust capacities: grantor, trust employee,
trustee, and beneficiary. As grantor he transfers to the trust in fee
simple his general passive assets, businesses, distributorships,
1. Many of the guarantees come in the form of verbal testimonials on the validity
and legality of the trusts, but some organizations provide that any challenge to the validity
of the trust will be defended in court a t no cost to the purchaser.
The history of the family estate trust concept is somewhat obscure, but one account
relates the story of Patrick Henry who allegedly set up the first such trust of record in
America for Governor Robert Morris of Virginia in 1765. The trusts were apparently little
publicized yet commonly used until the passage of the sixteenth amendment in 1913.
Following the income tax amendment, the family estate trust went into a period of disuse
until resurrected in the 1930's by Harry Morgan Phipps. The current surge of interest in
these trusts is attributed to the promotional abilities of James R. Walsh, who in 1972
revitalized Mr. Phipps' National Pure Trust Service format and created two sister organiEDUCAzations-Trust Inc. and Educational Scientific Publishers. See ESTATEGUARDIAN
TIONAL TRUST,HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT
OF THE PURE
LMNG TRUST1 (1976) (promotional
material distributed by E.G.E.T., San Diego, Cal.); Hill, Tax Cuts for Sale, Wall St. J.,
July 13, 1977, at 1, col. 5. In addition to "pure equity" and "family estate," this trust
instrument has also been referred to as the "Constitution," "apocalypse," "pure living,"
"Patrick Henry," "common law," and "family equity" trust. For the sake of convenience
this Comment will refer to the trust concept, which encompasses all of the above derivations to one extent or another, as the "family estate trust."
2. Efforts to minimize taxes are neither illegal nor unethical. The classic statement
on the subject was made by Judge Learned Hand:
Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so arranging one's affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody does so, rich or
poor; and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the
law demands: taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary contributions. To
demand more in the name of morals is mere cant.
Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848,850-51 (2d Cir. 1947). See also Knetsch v. United
States, 364 U.S. 361, 365 (1960); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U S . 465, 469 (1935); Chirelstein, 1,earned Handk Contribution to the Law of Tax Avoidance, 77 YALEL.J. 440 (1968).
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farms, and family residence, receiving units of beneficial interest
. ~ trust employee he contractually relinquishes to the
in r e t ~ r nAs
trust all his personal services, which may then be leased or loaned
out to third-party employers at the discretion of the trustees. As
trustee he, along with other trustees, is responsible for administering the trust and leasing out its employees to employers, patients, or clients who compensate the trust d i r e ~ t l yFinally,
.~
as
beneficiary he shares in the income of the trust to the extent of
the units he retains after conveying his other units to his spouse,
children, or other trusts.

11. COMPETING
POSITIONS
OF THE IRS AND TRUSTPROPONENTS
Proponents of the family estate trust maintain that the device minimizes income taxation yet remains in total compliance
with the letter of state trust law, the Internal Revenue Code, and
3. Units are essentially fractions of the beneficial ownership of the trust. For example,
in a 100-unit trust where the grantor conveys away all but fifteen units, he has retained a
15% interest in the trust income and assets.
In a community property jurisdiction, or where the husband and wife own the assets
to be conveyed to the trust in joint tenancy, it is necessary that one spouse's interest be
granted to the other spouse who then conveys the assets to the trust in fee simple in return
for 100 units of beneficial interest. The grantor then transfers to the other spouse one-half
(50) of the units in consideration of the prior interest in the community or joint tenancy.
Each spouse then has 50 units to retain or convey as he or she desires. The grantor, who
is generally the primary wage earner for the family, usually transfers the majority of his
units to his children or other trusts in order to further split the trust income. The grantor's
spouse likewise conveys away some units, but is advised to retain a sufficient interest to
maximize the likelihood of treatment as an adverse party. The units allegedly qualify as
a present interest in a security (the trust property), but, because of the discretionary
control over the trust by the trustees, the value of the units is considerably less than the
value of the underlying trust assets. Gift tax valuation on the units conveyed away is
determined on their remainder interest value as discounted according to Treas. Reg. §
25.2512-5 (1970). See EDUCATIONAL
SCIENTIFIC
PUBLISHERS,
A LAWYER'S
DISCUSSION
OF THE
LEGAL
ASPECTS
OF THE FAMILY
EQUITY
TRUST5-6 (1978) (promotional pamphlet distributed
by E.S. Publishers, Houston, Tex.) .
The irrevocability of the conveyance raises serious questions as to potential problems
in the event of a divorce. If the departing spouse retains her 50 units, can she then continue
to collect half of the trust's income (her ex-husband's wages) for the duration of the trust?
Since answers to questions of this nature are so uncertain, this is obviously one area where
the potential for litigation is enormous.
4. The board of trustees normally includes the grantor, his spouse, and a t least one
unrelated party. The trustees are generally paid a substantial amount of compensation
by the trust for their services in this capacity.
The integral relationship between family members in various family estate trust
capacities presents notorious opportunities for abuse. Some promoters of this type of trust
maintain that the family residence, having previously been transferred to the trust, can
be lived in without cost to the husband and wife (trustees) because they are protecting
and caring for trust assets; further claims include the deductibility of dinner between
Mom and Dad because they are really cotrustees discussing trust business. See Hill, Tax
Cuts for Sale, Wall St. J . , July 13, 1977 a t 1, col. 5.
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the applicable Treasury Regulations. The Internal Revenue Service, however, through revenue ruling^,^ news releases,%nd litigation7 has launched a vigorous attack against the trust. In its attack the IRS relies primarily on the following two arguments:
First, the assignment of services is in fact an assignment of income taxable to the assignor under I.R.C. § 61(a)(l); and second,
the retained control over the trust and the lack of an adverse
party on the board of trustees make the trust income taxable to
the grantor under I.R.C. $0 671-677.

A. Assignment of Services or Assignment of Income?
I.

The position of the IRS

The primary argument made by the IRS against the family
estate trust is that the assignment of services by the grantor to
the trust is in economic reality no more than an assignment of
income. The abatement of income tax liability through this sort
of income assignment has been prohibited by an unbroken string
of Supreme Court decisions originating with Lucas v. EarP
In Lucas the wage earner and his wife entered into a contract
stipulating that any income received by the husband was to be
considered joint income to both. Subsequently, the husband filed
a tax return claiming only one-half his earnings as income. The
IRS responded by assessing a deficiency. The Supreme Court
held that such an arrangement, although legal under state law,
would not be recognized under the Internal Revenue Code? The
Court declared that income would be taxed to the earner without
regard to "anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skilfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even
for a second in the man who earned it."Io
In three recent Tax Court cases the IRS has relied on the
Lucas rationale and has successfully taken the position that family estate trusts are anticipatory arrangements devised to divert
income from its earner. Consequently, in these cases trust income
has been found to be taxable to the earner personally under I.R.C.
§ 61(a)(l).I1
5. Rev. Rul. 75-258, 1975-2 C.B. 503; Rev. Rul. 75-257, 1975-2 C.B. 251.
6. I.R.S. News Release No. 1878, Aug. 31, 1977.
7. Wesenberg v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 559 (1978); Damm v. Commissioner, 36
T.C.M. (CCH) 793 (1977); Horvat v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 476 (1977).
8. 281 U.S. 111 (1930). See, e.g., United States v. Basye, 410 U S . 441 (1973); Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U S . 733 (1949).
9. 281 U.S. at 114.
10. Id. at 115.
11. I.R.C. Ei 61(a)(l) reads: "Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross

FAMILY ESTATE TRUSTS
In Horvat v. Commissioner, l2 the taxpayer contracted to give
to his family estate trust "exclusive use of [his] lifetime services
and all resultant earned remuneration."13 Thereafter, Horvath
employer continued issuing payroll checks to the taxpayer, who
then endorsed them over to the trust. Horvat failed to include as
personal income any of his salary received subsequent to the creation of the trust, and the IRS claimed a deficiency. The Tax Court
held in favor of the Service, primarily relying on the following
factors: First, there was no substantial business purpose for the
trust; second, there was no privity between the trust and the
employer since the services performed and the business activity
conducted were those of the petitioner and not of the trust; and
third, the petitioner retained control of the earnings.14
A similar arrangement was again rejected in Damm v.
Commissioner. l5 Damm, like Horvat, conveyed his assets and assigned his personal services to his family estate trust and notified
his employer of the assignment. Damm sent his employer the
Internal Revenue Service Employer Identification Number that
had been assigned to the trust and requested that all future payroll checks be made payable to the trust directly. The employer
refused to comply with the request and continued to issue the
payroll checks to Damm, who then endorsed them over to the
trust. The court held in favor of the IRS for three reasons: the
trust was not a party to the employment contracts; the disposition of earned income remained with Damm; and Damm, irrespective of the trust, retained control over the manner in which
the income was earned.16
Most recently, in the case of Wesenberg v. Commis~ioner,~~
a doctor employed as an instructor a t the University of Colorado
Medical School formed a family estate trust and requested that
the school make all future payroll checks payable to the "Richard
L. Wesenberg Family Estate (A Trust)." The employer complied
income means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the
following items: (1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions and similar
items . . . . " See United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441 (1973); Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949).
12. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 476 (1977). In Horvat two cases were decided together; both
petitioners argued pro se. The factual situation in Rev. Rul. 75-257, 1975-2 C.B. 251, is
virtually identical to that of Horvat.
13. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 477.
14. Id. at 478-79.
15. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 793 (1977).
16. Id. at 796.
17. 69 T.C. 559 (1978).
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with the request and subsequently sent all paychecks directly to
the trust. Nevertheless, the Tax Court found that
the ultimate direction and control over the earning of the compensation rested in Richard and not in the Trust. While Richard
may have conveyed, a t least in form, his services to the Trust,
in substance he was not a bona fide servant or agent of the Trust
with respect to the services he rendered the school.1u

As in Horvat and Damm,, the Tax Court in Wesenberg based its
holding on the findings that the trust had no privity of contract
with the third-party employer and the ultimate control over earnings was retained by Wesenberg and not the trust.lg
2.

The position of the trust proponents

The proponents of the family estate trust have not been discouraged by the results in Horvat, Damm, and Wesenberg. Although they admit that the mere assignment of income is taxable
under I.R.C. 8 61(a)(l) and Lucas u. Earl, they argue that in a
properly constructed family estate trust there is no assignment of
income a t all. In all three cases cited above, the income earner
contracted with his employer in an individual capacity rather
than as trustee. The trust, therefore, was not privy to the employment contract but was merely designated to receive the employment income. If, on the other hand, the trust itself is the contracting party and as such effectively leases out the services of the
trust employee to a third-party employer, the assignment of income theory should not apply. Trust proponents, asserting that
the question of control by the trust over the employee is dispositive, point to the "leased employee" doctrine as authority for
their conclusion that the trust employee should only be taxed on
the income actually paid him by the trust.20
The validity of a taxpayer's leasing his services to a corporate
18. Id. a t 562. The court concluded its opinion by stating: "Indeed, considering
Richard's education and intellectual ability, we find it difficult to believe that he envisioned the Trust as anything other than a flagrant tax avoidance scheme." Id. at 564. In
addition to back taxes and interest, Wesenberg was assessed a five percent penalty "due
to negligence or intentional disregard of rules and regulations (but without intent to defraud)." I.R.C. Ji 6653(a).
19. 69 T.C. at 562. In addition to the assignment of income theory, the Tax Court
also held that Wesenberg was taxable on the trust income under the grantor trust provisions, I.R.C. Ji Ji 674, 676-677.69 T.C. at 564.
20. See Brief for Petitioner at 20, Damm v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 793
SCIENTIFIC
PUBLISHERS,
AN ANALYSISOF THE HORVAT
TAXCOURT
DECI(1977); EDUCATIONAL
SION AND THE 1975 &VENUE RULINGS
ON FAMILY
TRUSTS 2 (1977) (promotional pamphlet
distributed by E.S. Publishers, Houston, Tex.).

7061

FAMILY ESTATE TRUSTS

711

entity has been firmly established since the early case of Charles
Laughton. 21 In this case, Laughton, the majority stockholder in a
closely held corporation, leased his talents and services to the
corporation. The corporation then contracted out the services of
its employee to various film studios, which paid the corporation
an amount significantly greater than that paid to the employee
as salary. The Tax Court held in favor of the taxpayer, who had
paid taxes only on the amount of salary paid to him by the corporation. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld Laughton's leased
employee argument because two conditions were present: First,
the corporation was controlled by a board of directors that could
exercise independent management discretion, notwithstanding
the fact that the employee was the majority stockholder; and
second, the corporation was established for the non-tax-related,
independent business purpose of joining efforts "with other employees of the company to create motion pictures."22
Trust proponents argue that the same rationale applies to
the family estate trust. If the trust has an independent business
reason for its existence and is the contracting agent with the
third-party employer for the services of the leased employee, the
employee should only be liable for the income he receives from
the trust regardless of what is actually paid to the trust by the
third-party employer.

3. Analysis of the IRS'and trust proponents'positions
The IRS is primarily concerned with whether or not the trust
is a sham device used to divert income from its earner to lessen
tax liability. On the other hand, trust proponents contend the
trust itself qualifies as the income earner under the leased employee doctrine.
The Service's position stems from the early case of Higgins
v. Smith,23where the Supreme Court upheld the Treasury Department's right to look beyond the mere form of a corporate
entity. The Court stated:
The Government may look at actualities and upon determination that the form employed for doing business or carrying out
the challenged tax event is unreal or a sham may sustain or
disregard the effect of the fiction as best serves the purposes of
21. 40 B.T.A. 101 (1939), remanded, 113 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1940). See also Rubin v.
Commissioner, 429 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1970); Fontaine Fox, 37 B.T.A. 271 (1938).
22. 113 F.2d 103, 104 (9th Cir. 1940).
23. 308 US. 473 (1940).
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the tax statute. To hold otherwise would permit the schemes of
taxpayers to supersede legislation in the determination of the
time and manner of taxation. It is command of income and its
benefits which marks the real owner of property.24

Relying on the Higgins rationale, the IRS has challenged the
tax status of numerous entities under the general captions of
"sham transaction" and "substance over form"; but, as demonstrated in Laughton, the Service's determinations have not always been upheld by the courts. The courts appear to hold that
if there is a bona fide business purpose for a leased employee
relationship other than the reduction of taxes, and if the taxpayer
complies with the letter of congressional tax legislation and state
incorporation statutes, the IRS will be precluded from resorting
to the subjective "common law of taxation"25 approach inherent
in the use of the general captions. Although the IRS clearly has
authority to ascertain the economic reality of a trust entity, the
leased employee doctrine may shelter the family estate trust as
long as the assignment of services by the grantor to the trust is
based on a non-tax-related business purpose.
In relying on the leased employee doctrine to support their
defense of the family estate trust, however, trust advocates have
assumed a heavy burden. Even if the family estate trust complies
with the letter of the law, the real issue is whether the assignment
of services to the family estate trust has sufficient justification,
aside from tax avoidance, to overcome the IRS contention that
the device is a sham. Both Laughton and the recent family estate
trust cases emphasized the importance of finding an independent
business purpose to justify the leased employee relationship. For
example, the appellate court in Laughton carefully considered
the Higgins admonition and concluded:
We take the [Higgins] opinion to mean that the "tax
event" is not an unreal attempt to use a corporation for a sham
transaction, procuring an advantageous tax consequence to the
taxpayer, if it may be considered as one primarily for an independent business purpose and not a transfer of assets (here
Laughton's services), with a retention of their control, solely to
reduce tax liability.26

Similarly, in Horvat the court noted:
24. Id. at 477-78.
25. See Brown, The Growing "Common Law" of Taxation, 34 S . CAL.L. REV.235
(1961).
26. 113 F.2d at 104 (emphasis added).
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While it is true that a viable business entity actually engaged
in business activity cannot be ignored, herein the conclusion is
inescapable that petitioners' family trusts were nothing more
than a vehicle designed to lessen petitioners' tax burden; clearly
the "tax laws permit no such easy road to tax a ~ o i d a n c e . " ~ ~

The IRS should be required to recognize the validity of the
trust entity only if a bona fide business purpose for the trust can
be shown. Thus, to withstand IRS attack, the family estate trust
must be able to demonstrate a reason for its existence other than
reduction of tax liability.
Considering the traditional emphasis by promoters of the
family estate trust on the tax-saving aspects of the device, it may
be quite difficult to show that any particular trust was established primarily for an independent business purpose. There are,
however, benefits associated with such a trust arrangement that
are not tax related and that might be asserted as legitimate,
independent purposes for establishing a family estate trust. For
example, the grantor might want to relinquish management responsibilities for his businesses to a professional management firm
that would serve as trustee. The trust device also allows a grantor
to arrange his affairs so as to avoid the publicity and expense of
probate proceedings following his death. Nevertheless, the courts
thus far have only considered independent business purposes;
therefore, the aforementioned trust benefits may not be sufficient
to satisfy the test unless the IRS and the courts will extend it to
encompass purposes beyond those currently described as business
purposes.
Should a true business purpose for a family estate trust be
found, yet another dilemma arises to confront an unwary trustor.
Although the trust may not then be vulnerable to an assignment
of income attack, the establishment of a business purpose will
lend credence to an alternative IRS contention that the family
estate trust is an association properly taxable as a corporation
under I.R.C. $ 7701. Section 7701 and its corresponding Treasury
regulations provide that if a trust has the function and appearance of a corporation it will be taxed as a corporation."
27. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 478-79 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (quoting United
States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441, 452 (1973)).
28. See Rev. Rul. 75-258, 1975-2 C.B. 503. The contention that a family estate trust
is an association taxable as a corporation under I.R.C. 4 7701 comes from an expanded
reading of Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935). Morrissey set forth a test to
distinguish between a private trust and a business trust taxable as a corporation. This
test has been embodied into a Treasury regulation which provides:
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In addition to the above difficulties, the grantor/employee
may be forced to eschew the position of trustee. A primary factor
in the vigorous prosecution of the family estate trust by the IRS
is the fact that the same person often fills the four positions of
grantor, employee, trustee, and beneficiary. Although a single
person may fill all four capacities under state trust law, such
blatant control over a taxable entity invites the close scrutiny of
IRS auditors.
If conservation of assets for the family, avoidance of probate,
and other such nontax considerations are the real purposes of the
trust, then these purposes can be served through an arrangement
whereby outsiders serve as trustees. The grantorlemployee can
remove the taint of sham from the assignment of his services by
having noncontrolled trustees negotiate with the third-party
employers instead of doing it himself while wearing his trustee
hat. But removing the appearance of sham by divesting the grantor of all power and control over the trust results in an untenable
loss of the grantor's personal and economic freedom. First, by
allowing an unrelated trustee to negotiate the third-party employment contracts, the employee is obligated to labor where,
when, and for whatever wages the trustee dictates. Depending on
the trust instrument, this condition of near servitude could continue for the twenty-five year duration of the trust. Second, the
use of unrelated trustees in an irrevocable trust instrument removes from the grantor the very control over the family estate
that the the trust was designed to provide. Essentially, the grantor would be making the unconscionable exchange of personal
freedom for freedom from taxation. The alternative format suggested clearly represents a drastic change from the current family
The term "association" refers to an organization whose characteristics require it to be classified for purposes of taxation as a corporation rather than as
another type of organization such as a partnership or a trust. There are a number of major characteristics ordinarily found in a pure corporation which, taken
together, distinguish it from other organizations. These are: (i) Associates, (ii)
an objective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom, (iii) continuity
of life, (iv) centralization of management, (v) liability for corporate debts limited to corporate property, and (vi) free transferability of interests. . . . An
organization will be treated as an association if the corporate characteristics are
such that the organization more nearly resembles a corporation than a partnership or trust.
Treas. Reg. O 301.7701-2(a)(1),T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409 (emphasis added).
The IRS contends the family estate trust possesses associates, business purposes, and
a preponderance of corporate characteristics over noncorporate characteristics and is
therefore an association taxable as a corporation. See Elmer Irvin Trust, 29 T.C. 846
(1958).
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estate trust instrument, yet the fact remains that the greater the
apparent control over the trust by the grantor, the greater the
likelihood of IRS challenge.

B. Family Estate Trusts as Grantor Trusts
In addition to the assignment of income theory, the Internal
Revenue Service has attacked family estate trusts under the grantor trust provisions of I.R.C. § 8 671-677.29In essence, these sections provide that income placed in trust will remain taxable to
the grantor to the extent that he retains a reversionary interest
in the trust property, or beneficial enjoyment of income from the
trust corpus without the prior approval of an adverse party.30An
adverse party is defined as any individual "having a substantial
beneficial interest in the trust which would be adversely affected
by the exercise or nonexercise of the power which he possesses
respecting the trust."31 Accordingly, a trustee does not qualify as
an adverse party unless he also has a substantial beneficial interest in the trust itself.32
1. T h e position of the IRS

The Internal Revenue Service's position that family estate
t r u s t s are grantor trusts was expressed i n D a m m u .
C o m m i ~ s i o n e rAlthough
.~~
the case was ultimately decided on the
assignment of income theory, the Service argued alternatively
that the family estate trust was subject to the grantor trust provisions of sections 671-677. Counsel for the IRS defined the purpose
behind the grantor trust provisions:
[Tlhe obvious purpose behind the grantor trust provisions is to
ensure that the grantor has not used the trust as a device to
escape taxation on the income of the trust property while retaining his effective access to the property andlor income. If such
power is retained by the grantor or by an individual not having
an interest in the trust adverse to the exercise of such power,
then the grantor is deemed to be the owner of that portion over
which he has retained such control.34
29. Rev. Rul. 75-257, 1975-2 C.B. 251; see Paxton v. Commissioner, 520 F.2d 923 (9th
Cir. 1975), Brief for Respondent at 22, Damm v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 793
(1977).
30. I.R.C. § 674(a).
31. I.R.C. § 672(a).
32. Paxton v. Commissioner, 520 F.2d 923,928 (9th Cir. 1975); Treas. Reg. § 1.672(a)l(a) (1956).
33. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 793 (1977).
34. Brief for Respondent at 22-23, Damm v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 793
(1977).
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In the family estate trust there are no named beneficiaries as
such; rather, the grantor receives "units of beneficial interest" in
exchange for the assets transferred and personal services assigned
to the trust. The grantor can then either retain the units or distribute them to his spouse, children, or other trusts. In Damm the
IRS not only contended that the grantor was taxable on the units
he retained, but argued that he was taxable on the entire trust
income. The IRS maintained that there could be no adverse party
among trustees whose beneficial interest in the trust was determined by possession of "units."35 Essentially, the IRS argued that
if a trustee's interest is represented by such units, he will receive
a fixed proportion of the proceeds of the trust regardless of
whether the trust is cancelled or continued. Such a trustee would
not be an adverse party because his interests would not be adversely affected by the exercise of his power as trustee.36Therefore, the IRS argued, the grantor should be taxed on the entire
trust income as he could control its disposition without the consent of any adverse party.37
2.

T h e position of the trust porponents

Proponents of the family estate trust obviously contend that
trust income should not be taxed to the grantor under sections
671-677. While they have distinct rationales for each grantor trust
provision in the Code, the basis for their argument is that, in a
properly structured family estate trust, the beneficial enjoyment
of the trust is controlled by adverse parties and the remainder
interests vest in the beneficiaries instead of reverting to the grantor.
Since the assets of a family estate trust are distributed to the
holders of the units of beneficial interest upon termination of the
trust, the grantor of the trust retains a reversionary interest in the
trust corpus only to the extent that he retains units of beneficial
interest. Trust proponents assert that section 673, which taxes the
grantor's reversionary interests in either trust corpus or income,3R
35. Id. at 25.
36. Id.
37. Section 674(a) indicates that a grantor will be considered the owner of that portion of a trust over which he retains a power of disposition without the approval or consent
of an adverse party. The IRS' argument that a trustee in a family estate trust cannot be
an adverse party because distributions of trust income andlor corpus would be made in
proportion to his holdings of beneficial units, if valid, would result in the grantor being
taxable under 5 674(a).
38. Section 673(a) states:
The grantor shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a trust in which
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therefore would not apply to units transferred to other beneficiaries.
As for trust income, trust proponents argue the grantor has
not retained sufficient power over the family estate trust to be
taxable under section 674. Section 674 taxes trust income to the
grantor only to the extent that the grantor can control the beneficial enjoyment of the trust income without the consent of an
adverse party.39In contrast to the IRS contention that holders of
units cannot qualify as adverse parties, the trust proponents
argue that such units represent proportionate shares in the equitable ownership of the trust equal to any other beneficial interest
in trust property. Accordingly, it is the proponents' position that
a trustee who holds units of beneficial interest is an adverse party
as defined by section 672(a).40
The question of retained beneficial enjoyment also arises
under section 675 and regulation 1.675-1," which tax the grantor
if he can obtain financial benefits from dealing with the trust that
would not be available in an arm's length t r a n ~ a c t i o n In
. ~ ~the
family estate trust, retained administrative powers over the trust
should not raise difficulties if the trust instrument requires all
transactions between the grantor and the trust to be on an arm's
length basis. This "arm's length," however, may be difficult for
the grantor of such a trust to maintain within the embrace of his
own family.
Trust proponents argue that the rule of section 676, which
provides that a grantor will be personally taxed on trust income
if he or a nonadverse party has power to revoke the trust or return
the corpus to the grantor, is inapplicable in the family estate trust
situation. They point to the fact that the power to terminate the
he has a reversionary interest in either the corpus or the income therefrom if,
as of the inception of that portion of the trust, the interest will or may reasonably be expected to take effect in possession or enjoyment within 10 years commencing with the date of the transfer of that portion of the trust.
39. I.R.C. 4 674(a).
40. Section 672(a) defines an adverse party as "any person having a substantial
beneficial interest in the trust which would be adversely affected by the exercise or nonexercise of the power which he possesses respecting the trust."
41. Section 675 provides in effect that the grantor is treated as the owner
of any portion of a trust if under the terms of the trust instrument or circumstances attendant on its operation administrative control is exercisable primarily for
the benefit of the grantor rather than the beneficiaries of the trust.
Treas. Reg. Si 1.675-1(a) (1956).
42. E.g., receiving interest-free loans from the trust, dealing with the trust for less
than full and adequate consideration, retaining the power to control the investment of
trust funds in a nonfiduciary capacity.
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trust is vested in the trustees, the majority of whom are adverse
parties, and that upon termination the assets of the trust are to
be distributed to the beneficiaries of the trust rather than reverting to the grantor.
Finally, the proponents contend that only if the grantor or a
nonadverse party has a power to distribute income to or for the
benefit of the grantor or his spouse will he be taxed under the
provisions of section 677." This rule should be inapplicable to the
family estate trust since such powers are vested in the trustees,
the majority of whom are adverse parties. In any event, it can
apply only to the extent the grantor retains units of beneficial
interest .44
3. Analysis of the IRS' and trust proponents' positions

From this brief review of the positions of the IRS and trust
proponents as to the applicability of the grantor trust sections of
the Code, it is apparent that the determinative issue is whether
a trustee who holds units of beneficial interest qualifies as an
adverse party. Contrary to the position of the IRS, the answer to
this question would appear to depend upon the substantiality of
the interests held by the trustee, and not upon the nature or form
of those interests.
When the IRS argued in Damm that a trustee holding units
of beneficial interest could never qualify as an adverse party,45it
took a position that is not supported by the Code, Treasury regulations, or case law. By way of definition, section 672(a) states in
part that "the term 'adverse party' means any person having a
substantial beneficial interest in the trust."46 The regulations
elaborate on the substantiality criterion by stating that "[aln
interest is a substantial interest if its value in relation to the value
of the property subject to the power is not insignificant. "47 Thus,
the real issue in determining whether a trustee holding units of
beneficial interest in a family estate trust qualifies as an adverse
party is the substantiality of his interest in relation to the total
value of the trust assets. Neither the Code nor the regulations
43. Section 677(a) deals with the treatment of a grantor who retains the right to
receive trust income either for himself or his spouse. The section applies even if the income
is not received in cash but is used to purchase life insurance policies on the grantor or his
spouse.
44. Proponents' grantor trust arguments were primarily derived from EDUCATIONAL
SCIENTIFIC
PUBLISHERS,
supra note 4, at 8-9.
45. See Brief for Respondent, Damm v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 793 (1977).
46. I.R.C. § 672(a) (emphasis added).
47. Treas. Reg. 5 l.672(a)-l(a) (1956) (emphasis added).
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require that the beneficial interest be expressed in terms of an
absolute figure or percentage of trust assets rather than as a specified number of units of beneficial interest. The form in which the
trustee's interest is held should be irrelevant as long as a determination can be made as to its value in relation to the total value
of all interests in the trust assets.
Recent case law affirms that the courts also consider the
substantiality of the interest rather than the form in which the
interest is held in determining whether a party is adverse under
, ~ ~Ninth Circuit
section 672(a). In Paxton v. C o m m i ~ s i o n e rthe
discussed the adverseness of a trustee who held "Certificates of
Interest" representing units in a family estate trust. The trustee
in question held 192 of a total of 5,000 units of interest in the
trust. The court affirmed the lower court's finding that the 3.84%
interest represented by the trustee's 192 units was not substantial
enough to qualify him as an adverse party in relation to the entire
trust corpus and income? In so doing, however, the court noted
that the trustee was an adverse party as to his 3.84%interest and
indicated that he could have been an adverse party as to the
entire trust if the units he held represented a somewhat greater
percentage of the total value of the trust assets.50Thus, the court
concerned itself entirely with the substantiality of the trustee's
interest and did not automatically disqualify the trustee because
his interest was expressed in "units" rather than more conventionally as a percentage of the trust assets.
Similarly, in Wesenberg v. Commissioner" the Tax Court
considered a case involving units of beneficial interest in a family
estate trust situation. After quoting the definition of adverse parties under section 672(a), the court concluded that a beneficiary
holding "units" was an adverse party.52In this case, however,
none of the trustees was a beneficiary and therefore the trust
income was found to be taxable to the grantor since he could
exercise his powers over the trust income and corpus without the
consent or approval of an adverse party.53

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that neither the In48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

520 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 926-27.
Id. at 927.
69 T.C. 559 (1978).
Id. at 563.
Id.
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ternal Revenue Service nor the proponents of the trust are approaching the family estate trust issue from an entirely objective
position. The IRS treats this device as a sham and attempts to
place on the taxpayer the burden of justifying the trust as a
taxable entity.54In recent years the IRS has won every Tax Court
challenge of the trust," and the United States Courts of Appeal
have made it plain that the clearly erroneous doctrine will apply
to these Tax Court de~isions.~"eversal has never been granted
in favor of the taxpayer in a family estate trust case.
On the other hand, none of the cases brought to trial by the
Service has involved a trust providing for privity of contract between the trust and the third-party employer so as to raise the
"leased employee" issue.57In addition, none of the trusts challenged in court thus far has provided a substantial beneficial
interest to the trustees so as to directly challenge the Service's
position on the adverse party issue.
It remains to be seen what the result will be when the IRS
finally challenges a family estate trust that meets the letter of the
law in both of the above areas. Supporting the Service's position
is basic federal tax policy which requires that "the realities of the
54. Bernuth v. Commissioner, 470 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1972).
55. Wesenberg v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.559 (1978); Damm v. Commissioner, 36
T.C.M. (CCH) 793 (1977); Horvat v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 476 (1977). The
success record of the IRS in litigating family estate trust cases is a t least partly due to
the fact that it has complete discretion to choose which cases it will prosecute.
56. E.g., Paxton v. Commissioner, 520 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1975); Paster v. Commissioner, 245 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1957); see FED.R. CIV. P. 52(a).
57. In the case of Rubin v. Commissioner, 429 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1970), Judge Friendly
again considered the leased employee doctrine:
"Loaned employee" cases such as this reveal a tension between competing
policies on tax law. On one side is the principle of a graduated income tax, which
is undercut when individuals are permitted to split their income with others or
to spread it over several years. Lucas v. Earl. . . . Opposing this is the policy
of recognizing the corporation as a taxable entity distinct from its shareholders
in all but extreme cases. Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436
(1943).
Id. a t 652 (citations omitted). In Rubin the court reversed the Tax Court's determination
of taxpayer liability based upon the "common law of taxation" and remanded to the Tax
Court to make a new determination utilizing the provisions of 5 482. Judge Friendly
castigated the Tax Court's use of arbitrary and clouded tax terms:
References to "substance over form" and the "true earner" of income
merely restate the issue in cases.like this: Who is the "true earner"? What is
substance and what is form? Moreover, [the Tax Court does] so in a way which
makes it appear that these questions can be answered simply by viewing the
facts with appropriate suspicion.
429 F.2d a t 653. For an interesting diatribe on the lRSYattacks on the family estate trust,
see Tkach, The Pure Equity Trust-How I Use It to Beat the IRS and Malpractice
PRAC.,
Dec. 1976, a t 15.
Lawyers, PRIVATE
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taxpayer's economic interest, rather than the niceties of the conveyancer's art, . . . determine the power to tax."" Moreover,
since Lucas v. EarlSBthe Supreme Court has repeatedly taken the
pbsftion that assignment of income to another will not relieve its
earner of tax assessment regardless of compliance with state
law.BoThe family estate trust carries an additional burden because it involves the grantor's family members in beneficiary and
trustee capacities and accordingly invites the "special scrutiny"
which the Supreme Court has declared is necessary "where the
parties to a transfer are members of the same family group."61
Family estate trusts can conceivably be constructed to conform with the literal requirements of trust law, the leased employee doctrine, and sections 61 and 671-677. However, to construct a trust which will withstand the "sham" caption attack by
the IRS, the grantor may be forced to relinquish to noncontrolled
trustees such control over his own affairs as to render himself a
virtual slave to his family estate trust. The very instrument by
which a taxpayer seeks to "free" himself from the burden of taxes
may result in the forfeiture of freedoms more substantial than the
freedom from taxation. The creation of such a trust is possible but
it has yet to be tested in court.
In the meantime, family estate trusts are being vigorously
promoted across the nation, and the IRS is challenging them on
all fronts. Anyone purchasing such a trust should, for the present,
be prepared to either pay back taxes, interest, and penalties when
challenged by the Service, or defend his trust in court with little
prospect of prevailing.

Dennis M. Richardson
58. Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 316 U.S. 56, 58 n. 1 (1942).
59. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
60. United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441 (1973); Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S.
591 (1948); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
61. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 605 (1948).

